approach makes this analysis particularly relevant to a humanistic-experiential standpoint. In contrast to more psychodynamic perspectives, the paper also attempts to understand human inter-relating -and particularly problematic relating -in terms of "here-and-now" biases and misperceptions, as opposed to more historically-or pathologically-derived phenomena, such as transference.
In addition, the paper looks at the implications of this analysis for the practice of experiential-humanistic psychotherapy, identifying a set of inter-experiential "task markers," and proposing a set of potentially helpful responses (cf. Processexperiential/Emotion-focused Therapy, Greenberg, Rice, & Elliott, 1993) . Here, as with many other process-experiential tasks, the actual interventions being outlined are not entirely new, but this is a first attempt to systematize such forms of practice and to ground them in a specific body of psychological knowledge. As with all other process-experiential tasks, it should also be emphasized that there is no suggestion here that these inter-experiential interventions will be appropriate or helpful for all clients. Rather, by its very nature, the aim of such an analysis is to try and specify the particular instances or difficulties for which these inter-experiential practices may be of value.
INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS
How does one person perceive another person's experiences, and are those perceptions likely to be accurate? Laing's (1969) starting point is that one person can never have a direct awareness of another person's experiences of his or her world:
"He cannot see through the other's eyes and cannot hear through the other's ears" (p.28) . This means that, however intuitive, empathic or psychologically-minded an individual may be, his or her perception of another person's experience will always be dependent, at least to some extent, on that other's public actions and characteristics, and these are likely to represent only a segment of how that other actually experiences his or her world. This is for a number of reasons: first, most human beings make deliberate -as well as non-conscious -efforts to manage those aspects of their experiencing that are seen by others (Goffman, 1971) , with some experiences forever retained at a private level. Second, an observer only ever sees a target individual in a limited range of circumstances, for instance, at work and at conferences, but not at home or with friends. Hence, while an observer may be able to make an informed guess as to what another human being is experienced, this will always be based on incomplete data, such that the possibility of having an entirely accurate understanding of another's experiences is likely to be small. Moreover, the fact that our perceptions of others are reliant on those others' public characteristics means that the way we perceive them is likely to be biased in the direction of their self-presentations, and this is what psychological research indicates (for instance, Storms, 1973) . A classic illustration of this is the way that quiz masters tend to be perceived as more knowledgeable than their contestants, even though an observer, logically, would know that they have been fed the questions and answers as part of their role. In other words, although, intuitively, we may have a sense that someone has many more sides to them than what can be seen at a public level, there is a marked tendency to experience others in the direction of their selfpresentation, and this seems to be because that presentation is of greater perceptual salience than any inferred characteristics (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1999) .
Such an analysis does not deny the possibility that human beings have the capacity to deeply and intuitively understand the experiences of others; indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the capacity to empathize and to understand other minds is an innate human characteristic (see, Cooper, 2001 ). Yet it is clear from the research evidence, and the world around us, that a deep empathic understanding of others is not the usual state of human affairs: that human beings do, sometimes violently, misperceive others' experiences. From a humanistic standpoint, we might want to argue that this is primarily a failure of actualization rather than an innate human characteristic; but the cognitive social psychology evidence cited above, as well as research into "theory of mind" and "mentalization" processes (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2000) , suggest that the ability to conceptualize others' experiences is not wholly inbuilt. Rather, to be fully actualized, it seems to require particular kinds of cognitive, interpersonal and social development, as well as conscious effort and will.
Research from these fields also suggests that the ability to accurately conceptualize others' experiences is likely to vary significantly across individuals (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000) ; and, as with Laing (1969 ), Cooper (2005 and Interpersonal Psychotherapists (e.g. Stuart & Robertson, 2003; Sullivan, 1953; Weissman, Markowitz, & Klerman, 2000) , difficulties in conceptualizing others' experiences have been associated with various forms of psychological distress. One reason for this may be that an inability to understand how others' experience their world can lead to difficulties in interpersonal relationships, and this has been shown to be a key predisposing factor for many different psychological difficulties (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978; Segrin, 2001 From a psychodynamic perspective, it might be hypothesized that Ismail's tendency to perceive Maureen as strong and powerful -despite her expressed vulnerabilities -is because he projects on to her qualities from an earlier domineering figure in his life, such as his mother. Alternatively, it might be argued that Ismail experiences Maureen in this way because of his own feelings of low self-esteem. Both of these explanations may have some validity. What is also evident in the work, however, is that Ismail finds it difficult to believe that Maureen is hurt and vulnerable because she just seems so angry so much of the time, and the more Ismail explores this possibility -recognizing that underneath the anger she may actually experience a great deal of vulnerability -the more the vicious cycle starts to unwind.
EXPLORING INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS IN PRACTICE
What are home?" The point here would not be for Ismail to come up with the "right" answer or to take him away from his own experiencing, but to encourage him to reflect on his perception of Maureen's experience, and perhaps to then go on and test his perception out by asking Maureen what she is actually feeling and thinking. In a sense, the aim here is to help clients get to a place where they can empathize more fully with others:
where they have a more accurate understanding of how others experience their world, and hence are less likely to fall into misunderstandings and interpersonal conflicts. In other words, from an intersubjective standpoint, psychological wellbeing is not only associated with the experience of being empathized with (cf. Rogers, 1957 Rogers, , 1959 but also of being able to extend that empathy to others (cf. Yalom, 2001 ): what we might call the development of "other-awareness," a corollary to the more familiar process of evolving "self-awareness."
Helping clients to develop other-awareness may also be an important element in helping them achieve a more positive sense of self-worth. As argued above, observers tend to perceive others in terms of their self-presentations, and because those self-presentations will tend to mask feelings of vulnerability, uncertainty and inadequacy, observers will tend towards perceiving others as more confident, capable and self-assured than they actually are. and, indeed, by modeling a congruent way of being (Rogers, 1957) , humanisticexperiential psychotherapists may also help clients to develop more transparent modes of relating. In some instances, however, it may also be helpful for psychotherapists simply to encourage or challenge clients to be honest with others about what they are feeling or thinking (a strategy sometimes advocated in Interpersonal Psychotherapy, Stuart & Robertson, 2003) . For example: a client complains that her husband has no idea how stressful it is for her to look after the children. He goes to work, comes home, puts his feet up, she says, and expects her to clean up for him and make his food when she feels she has been working just as hard all day. She is asked how she feels about this: "Disrespected, resentful, angry." She is helped to explore these feelings, but at some point, she is also asked whether she has ever actually told her husband how she feels. She says that she probably has done, "Just not directly, but he must know what's going." This is explored further, and it emerges that the client has never really told her husband about how hard she feels she works and how hurt she feels about his behavior: she just feels he should know this. In response to this, the psychotherapist suggest that, perhaps, sometimes people are not as aware of our experiences as we would like them to be, and he asks her if she thinks it would be helpful to communicate directly to her husband about her resentment and hurt. "I suppose I could give it a go," she says, "What have I got to lose?" The remainder of the session is spent considering how she might go about doing this. In terms of why people tend to be such poor judges of others' perceptions of them, social psychological research has come up with one very plausible explanation: "people's beliefs about how others view them are based primarily on their perceptions of themselves" (Kenny & Depaulo, 1993, p.154) . In other words, people tend to assume that others see them as they see themselves, and struggle to put to one side their own self-perception to see themselves "from the outside". In a summary of the research evidence, for instance, Kenny and DePaulo (1993) it is a key distortion associated with avoidant and paranoid personality types (Reinecke & Freeman, 2003) and Interpersonal Psychotherapists have identified it as a common factor in marital disputes (Stuart & Robertson, 2003) . Indeed, to some extent, it could be argued that this metaperceptual error is a key factor in any interpersonal conflicts. In the example of Ismail, for instance, the problem is not just that he feels criticized; the problem is that he feels criticized and berated, and, at some level, assumes that Maureen knows how awful he feels. "Why does she go on criticizing me all the time?" he complains. In fact, though, what seems to be the case is that Maureen perceives Ismail as self-contained, confident and oblivious to her criticisms; and, had Ismail been aware of this metaperception, his response to her might have been much more conciliatory in the first place.
METAPERCEPTIONS
In the example of Maureen and Ismail, both parties assume that the other sees them as more inadequate than they actually do and, in my clinical and personal experience, this is nearly always the direction that metaperceptual errors take. Perhaps the reason for this is that, at a phenomenological level, human beings are so aware of their own doubts, uncertainties and vulnerabilities that it is very difficult to believe that others can not see them too (again, the perceptual salience bias); yet, as argued above, observers are often much more influenced by an individual's public self.
This assumption, that other people can see our flaws, can then do much to further reinforce a person's feelings of low self-esteem. Not only do they see themselves as inadequate, but they believe others see them as inadequate, and this further compounds their sense of not being good enough. As Symbolic Interaction
Theory suggests (Mead, 1934) , how people see themselves is highly dependent on how they imagine others see them; but if how they imagine others see them is dependent on how they see themselves, it can become almost impossible to break out of a negative self-image.
EXPLORING METAPERCEPTIONS IN PRACTICE
If metaperceptual errors, like errors in interpersonal perceptions, are a potent source of psychological distress, then helping clients to reflect on, and challenge, their metaperceptions may be a useful therapeutic task. Here, one of the great advantages of the psychotherapeutic context -and, in particular, group psychotherapy -is that clients have an opportunity to share their metaperceptions with one or more others, and to find out how they are actually experienced. As a brief example: towards the end of a session of psychotherapy recently, a client said to me, "Well, I guess that's it, me talking rubbish again, you must get so bored listening to me." Here, my initial Here, in contrast to classic transferential work, the aim was not solely to heighten the clients' awareness of how he or she perceives others; nor was it simply to provide the client with unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1957) . Rather, it was to help the client really see the discrepancy between his assumption about how he was being experienced and how another person actually experienced him. Clinically, the hope is that the client may then generalize this learning out, and question his or her metaperceptual assumptions in other interpersonal relationships: if I, as a therapist, feel engaged when he assumes I am feeling bored, perhaps the same is true for other people: that he, for instance, is putting considerable energy into keeping other people entertained when, in fact, they already enjoy being with him. Such responsesparticularly when challenging clients' negative metaperceptual assumptions -are very consistent with the contemporary empirical evidence on self-disclosures (Hill & Knox, 2002) and feedback (Claiborn, Goodyear, & Horner, 2002) , which indicate that positive "self-involving" statements (i.e., expressions of the therapist's positive personal response to the client in the here-and-now) are particularly closely correlated with good outcomes (see, Cooper, 2008) .
Of course, within the psychotherapeutic dyad, it is not just clients who may make metaperceptual errors. Indeed, research suggests that psychotherapists are even less accurate than clients at judging how they are seen by others (Michels, 2000) .
Furthermore, as with the majority of human beings, the evidence suggests that psychotherapists also tend to underestimate the esteem with which others hold them in: assuming, for instance, that clients see them as more neurotic, and as less conscientious, agreeable and supportive, than they actually do (Michels, 2000) .
Hence, as with "neurotic" countertransference (Gelso & Hayes, 2002) , it would seem important that psychotherapists develop an awareness of any potential discrepancies between how they assume others perceive them and how those others actually do, such that these misperceptions do not cause miscommunications and ruptures in the therapeutic relationship. A psychotherapist, for instance, who assumes that others see her as weak and vulnerable, but comes across as confident and selfassured, may be more likely to respond defensively to a client who is trying to "meet"
her confidence than a psychotherapist who knows that others see her as powerfuleven if she does not feel that way, herself. On training programs, one structured means of facilitating this self-awareness is through interpersonal perceptual exercises.
A simple and effective version of this is to ask students to form groups of four, and then to spend ten to fifteen minutes completing a two by three grid, in which they are asked to write down how they experience each of the three other people in their group, and how they imagine each of those three other people experience them. Here, as elsewhere in this exercise, students are specifically encouraged to remain phenomenological in their descriptions (e.g., "I feel excited when I'm with you," rather than "You are an exciting person"), to avoid making judgments, to be honest (within appropriate limits), and to give specific feedback rather than making bland generalizations. Students are then invited to spend twenty minutes with each member of their small group, sharing in the dyad how they imagine that that person experiences them and receiving feedback from that other on what that person's actual experiencing of them is like. At the end of the exercise, students have an opportunity to discuss this experience in their groups of four, and then in the large group, with a particular focus on the accuracy of their metaperceptions and any systematic biases that may have taken place.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, there are parallels in this inter-experiential work with working with transferential and countertransferential issues, but there are also some significant differences. First, consistent with a more humanistic-existential perspective (e.g., Yalom, 2001 ) as well as the empirical research (Hill & Knox, 2002) , a rationale is presented for therapists going beyond, where appropriate, a "neutral stance" and sharing with their clients how they are actually experiencing them. Not only is this, as argued in this paper, an opportunity for clients to examine the accuracy of their perceptions and metaperceptions but if, as suggested above, people tend to underestimate the esteem they are afforded by others, then it can be a powerful opportunity for the client to receive positive, and often quite surprising, feedback.
Second, in contrast to transferential and countertransferential work, the assumption in this practice is that misjudgments in the inter-experiential realm are not always due to unresolved issues in early childhood. Certainly, from an experiential standpoint, it is acknowledged that they might be; but misjudgments are also seen as emerging from the very nature of the here-and-now inter-experiential encounter, such that this may also be an appropriate area of therapeutic exploration.
From its non-directive beginnings (Rogers, 1942) , experiential-humanistic psychotherapists have increasingly developed strategies and practices that can help clients deepen their awareness of their experiencing (e.g. Gendlin, 1996; Greenberg et al., 1993; Mahrer, 1996) . In process-experiential terms (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg et al., 1993) , these strategies can be described as "tasks", consisting of a task marker ("a behavioral expression of a particular experienced difficulty" (Elliott et al., 2004) ), an intervention, and a desired end state. The interexperiential work being outlined here, then, can be thought of as another set of process-experiential tasks, which psychotherapists may introduce, spontaneously or deliberately, into the therapeutic exploration. From the analysis presented in this paper, three inter-experiential tasks, in particular, can be identified (see Table 1 ):
inviting clients to explore, and test out, their assumptions about what others are experiencing; inviting clients to explore the possibility of communicating their wants to those who might be able to meet them; and challenging clients' metaperceptual errors in the psychotherapeutic relationship through appropriate self-disclosure.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
As with other process-experiential tasks, such strategies may also be helpful for psychotherapists of other orientations. Obviously, they will not be appropriate for all clients, and in some cases could detract from a much-needed intrapersonal focus, but for clients with long-standing or acute difficulties in the interpersonal field, an exploration of the inter-experiential realm may be a valuable element of the psychotherapeutic work. 
